

## 6 Heritage and Violence

One of the odd things about the arrival of the era of the modern nation-state was that for a state to prove that it was modern, it helped if it could also prove that it was ancient. A nation that wanted to show that it was up-to-date and deserved a place among the company of modern states needed, among other things, to produce a past. This past was not just a piece of symbolic equipment, like a flag or an anthem, with which to organize political allegiance and demonstrate a distinct identity. As many recent studies of nationalism point out, deciding on a common past was critical to the process of making a particular mixture of people into a coherent nation.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of the nation presents a way of living the experience of social relations by imagining them to extend back over a continuous period of time. The political community can then understand its present historically. The projection into the past may help make the present seem natural, disguising some of the arbitrariness, injustice, and coercion on which it depends. Historical thinking achieves this not just by projecting a past, but by organizing that past as the life of a self-directing object, the “nation” or “society.” Contemporary political arrangements acquire a degree of inevitability by appearing as the genetic destiny of this historical being.

Recent writings on nationalism have also pointed out that to produce a past a nation-state had to produce a place. If making the nation depended on extending present social relations back through time, this could only be done by defining their geographical boundaries. Benedict Anderson argues that the idea of the nation came about when modern forms of writing enabled the social worlds of individual citizens to expand. Innovations such as the modern novel and newspaper made it possible for people to imagine unknown others as members of the same community.<sup>2</sup> Yet in many parts of the world, as Anderson also acknowledges, the idea of the nation re-

quired people not only to expand their sense of community in new ways, but in equally novel ways to constrict it. People's sense of religious community or tribal cognation, their networks of trade and migration, communities of learning and law, and patterns of imperial power and allegiance were in many places much more diverse than the narrow boundaries of modern nation-states. Ernest Renan famously remarked that the idea of the nation required that people learn to forget certain aspects of their past.<sup>3</sup> Many people also had to learn to forget, or at least to reconsider, their sense of place. They were supposed to reduce the significance of those interconnections, exchanges, genealogies, hegemonies, moral systems, and migrations that defined a social landscape whose horizons reached beyond what became the boundaries of the nation, or even to forget their existence altogether.<sup>4</sup>

Until the late nineteenth century, those in power in Cairo did not consider themselves to be ruling over an object that corresponds to the twentieth-century nation-state known by the name of Egypt. In the 1930s, a British historian of colonial India popularized the view of Mehmed Ali, the Ottoman governor of Cairo in the first half of the preceding century, as "the founder of modern Egypt."<sup>5</sup> Yet Mehmed Ali saw himself as a provincial governor within the Ottoman Empire, not as the ruler of a political entity defined by its geographic body. He undertook a remarkable program of industrialization and military expansion, colonized the Sudan, and took control of Ottoman provinces in Arabia, Palestine, and Syria. As Khaled Fahmy shows, however, these developments were not organized and undertaken as a proto-nationalist project to build a territorially imagined "modern Egypt," but were an attempt to remake, from the province of Cairo, the Ottoman order.<sup>6</sup> Politics was imagined and undertaken as a world of expanding imperial authority, not of territorially bounded nation-states. The particular geographic state that began to emerge in the colonial period, it follows, was one of several possible outcomes of this imperial history.<sup>7</sup>

The relatively recent formation of the national state is obscured by the English words routinely used to translate Arabic place-names from the nineteenth century. Ottoman provinces were generally referred to by the name of the city that ruled them.<sup>8</sup> Mehmed Ali was the governor of the province of Misr, or Cairo. The term suggested not the city alone but the city and its country, meaning the hinterland of towns and villages that supported it, politically and materially. This meaning was also invoked with phrases such as "the Cairo region" and "Cairo country."<sup>9</sup> From the later nineteenth century, however, the word Cairo (*misr*) also came to be used by extension to describe a new object, the territorial state. Phrases like

"the country of Cairo" (*bilad misr*) were shortened to just *misr*, and the word came to be used interchangeably for the city and the country. Modern scholars, accustomed to thinking of all history as the history of nation-states, began to write anachronistically of the Ottoman province of "Egypt" (instead of Cairo). The term Egypt had come to refer to a spatial unit identified by geographical boundaries. The older phrases did not picture a territorial object but referred to the place in terms of a relationship—the connection between a city and hinterland.

One might suppose that the Lower Nile valley, compared to many other parts of the world, offered a well-defined geography and history within which to imagine a self-contained society. It should have been relatively easy to picture Egypt as a self-sufficient nation, to minimize the wider relations people may have had with other regions, and to give its particular mixture of communities a singular and self-contained past. The survival of monuments from more than five thousand years before, indeed the powerful image of what we call "ancient Egypt" as the cradle of civilization, would seem to offer modern Egyptian nationalism a neat and uncontroversial way to lay together superincumbent images of people, place, and past.

Yet constructing the past is never so straightforward. In the first place, ancient monuments do not automatically belong to one's own past. As someone from England, I can admire the imaginative power and ancient precision of Stonehenge, but I cannot feel those stones as part of my own past. In order to belong to one's history, monuments must connect with some aspect of one's social identity. Something similar seems to be true of the way the monuments of ancient Egypt figure in the politics of Egyptian nationalism. Periodically an effort was made to present the Pharaonic past as a source of modern Egyptian national identity. The idea that modern Egypt is a society whose ancestry goes back in a continuous line to a Pharaonic beginning is also the view of the nation's history found in Egyptian school textbooks.<sup>10</sup> However, such uses of the past have generally been of limited political use in the country's modern politics.

The most sustained effort to invoke the glories of ancient Egypt as the source of modern Egyptian identity came in the second quarter of the twentieth century, following the discovery of Tutankhamen's tomb in the Valley of the Kings, near Luxor, in 1922. When the British archaeologist Howard Carter unearthed the riches of the first royal tomb to be found intact in modern times, the event attracted worldwide attention. The discovery coincided with Egypt's winning partial independence from the British

military occupation established in 1882, and provided the new nationalist government with a powerful expression of the nation's identity. The government refused to allow the British archaeologists to take possession of 50 percent of the discovered treasure, the practice followed with earlier finds.<sup>11</sup> Its determination to keep control of the treasure provided a useful demonstration of the government's newly acquired authority. Yet in the years following this event, the Pharaonic past played only a subordinate and diminishing role in Egyptian nationalism.

In architecture, a neo-Pharaonic style came briefly into fashion, but its importance lasted less than a decade.<sup>12</sup> For a few more years, a group of conservative writers with cultural ties to Europe continued to insist on the significance of the nation's Pharaonic origins. But they did so as part of an argument against northern Europeans who insisted on the Oriental and therefore backward character of Egypt, and against local intellectuals who insisted on the exclusively Islamic character of their society. The writers' concern was to show that Egypt was a modern, Western nation, a view to be proven by the fact that the West's own past lay within Egypt. The significance of the past for these writers was not so much that it gave the nation a distinct and authentic identity, but that it showed that the nation belonged to the larger community of the West, and was therefore modern. The role of the past, in Dirks's phrase, was to serve as a sign of the modern.<sup>13</sup>

In the same period a right-wing populist party, Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatah), began to emphasize the importance of the Pharaonic past, finding there an expression of its belief in leader worship, militarism, and an Egyptian imperialism stretching from the Mediterranean to the equator. This too was short-lived. By the 1930s most political argument in Egypt had reverted to themes that connected more readily with people's everyday experience and self-conception, principally the themes of Islam, Arabism, and anti-imperialism.<sup>14</sup> These political identifications did not necessarily refer to the confines of the Nile valley, and gave local politics a much wider resonance than a purely Egyptian nationalism.

The difficulties and ambiguities in the production of the nation's past can be more fully understood if one shifts one's attention from the history of nationalism, as it is conventionally written, to the political process that I call making the nation. I find it useful here to think in terms of Bhabha's distinction between the nation as pedagogy and the nation as performance.<sup>15</sup> The history of nationalism reconstructs the more or less coherent story of how the nation emerges as a pedagogical object. It pieces together the official nation that is invoked in the ideology of political parties, the propaganda of government programs, the imagery of a national film in-

dustry, the rhetoric of school textbooks, the memoirs of public officials, and the news reporting and opinion making of the mass media. These sources constitute the formal archive examined by any standard history of the emergence of twentieth-century Egyptian nationalism.<sup>16</sup> What such an account generally overlooks is the more mundane and uncertain process of producing the nation. I have in mind the variety of efforts, projects, encounters, and struggles in which the nation and its modern identity are staged and performed. The difference between performance and pedagogy is not a question of looking at the practical realm rather than a realm of ideas, or the local rather than the national. Both pedagogy and performance involve the making of meaning, and both take place in particular sites among particular parties. What is different about making the nation is that it always involves the question of otherness.

In the nation as pedagogy, the emergence of the national community is understood as the history of a self that comes to awareness, or of a people that begins to imagine its peoplehood. History is written to describe the growing self-awareness or imagination of a collective subject. This imagination takes the form of a gradual revealing of the collective subject to itself, a revelation shaped by those powers of communication, reason, and consciousness that define our understanding of an emergent self. There is no encounter with otherness, except as part of the general discovery of a world beyond the self. In the performative making of the nation, on the other hand, otherness plays a constitutive role. The nation is made not out of a process of self-awareness, but out of encounters in which this self is to be made out of others; or rather, is to be made by making-other. The nation is made out of projects in which the identity of the community as a modern nation can be realized only by distinguishing what belongs to the nation from what does not, and by performing this distinction in particular encounters. Unlike conventional accounts of the emergence of the nation as pedagogy, our understanding of such encounters cannot be governed by the consciousness of a collective subject that produces the meaning of the nation; this collective subject, the nation, is not the author of the performance, only its occasional effect. Moreover, one can bring into view the forms of difficulty, uncertainty, violence, and subversion that the production of the nation may involve.

In Egypt, one of the most important figures in this process of making the self through making-other is the figure of the peasant. In the preceding two chapters I examined a variety of mostly foreign representations of the peasant. The new national elite within Egypt developed a more complex relationship to the countryside, a theme that figured prominently in early

nationalist fiction, film, and political argument. This chapter takes two interconnected episodes from twentieth-century Egypt, both concerned with the politics of national identity and cultural heritage, and both involving the lives of a local village community. One is a campaign launched in the 1940s to define and preserve a national cultural heritage, pursued through a struggle to create a national architecture based on the vernacular forms of the Egyptian village. The other is a dispute over the protection and presentation of the heritage of ancient Egypt, in particular the Theban Necropolis near Luxor where Howard Carter earlier unearthed the treasures of King Tutankhamen. In 1945 these two different efforts to produce and defend a national heritage came together in the plans to demolish and rebuild a village in southern Egypt. In the 1990s, more than half a century later, the village remained the site of an unresolved struggle over the country's national heritage.

#### MAKING THE NATION

In 1945 the Antiquities Department of the Egyptian government commissioned the Cairo architect Hassan Fathy to design and build a village to rehouse the inhabitants of the village of Gurna. The village lay on the west bank of the river Nile opposite the town of Luxor, four hundred miles south of Cairo, adjacent to Shahhat's village of Bu'airat, which we were introduced to in chapter 4. It consisted of a group of hamlets stacked along the desert escarpment at the valley's edge, amid the ancient rock-cut tombs and funerary temples known as the Theban Necropolis. A year or two earlier the Department of Antiquities had been embarrassed by the removal of an entire wall of one of the ancient tombs under its guard. It blamed the local inhabitants for the theft and decided they should be removed from the hillside and housed in a new village, to be built amid the sugarcane fields of the valley below.

Hassan Fathy was a visionary architect. In Gurna he pioneered the adoption of what later came to be known as "appropriate technology." Believing in the value and virtue of vernacular building methods, he rejected the use of reinforced concrete and mass-produced red brick—materials that were already becoming the standard in public housing projects—and insisted on building with handmade bricks produced in the local manner from mud, mixed with straw and dried in the sun. Mud brick was more affordable, he argued, especially if the villagers themselves were allowed to participate in the building, making their own bricks out of local earth, and provided better insulation against the heat of summer. It was also more

aesthetically pleasing, he believed, especially when used not just for walls but also for roofs, which could be made to support themselves in the form of elegant vaults and domes. Fathy built New Gurna as a model village to demonstrate the affordability and beauty of this vernacular peasant architecture. He intended it as a prototype, not only for other public housing projects in Egypt, but for the development of an Egyptian national style.<sup>17</sup>

New Gurna became internationally famous. Its construction announced the rejection of modernism in architecture and the desire to reappropriate the styles and materials of an indigenous national heritage. The building of the model village also marked, as Kees van der Spek notes, the moment of this vernacular style's untimely death.<sup>18</sup> The government purchased fifty acres of sugarcane land in 1945, a dike was built to keep out the irrigation water, and the construction of the village proceeded over the following three winters. In 1948, with only a fifth of the village completed, Fathy was forced to abandon the project, partly because of bickering between government departments, but mostly because one night that winter men from the old hamlets of Gurna, whose families opposed the planned eviction and resettlement, cut the dike and flooded the low-lying village.

Fathy's account of these events, published twenty years later, expresses his disappointment at the failure of his plans "to revive the peasant's faith in his own culture" and his bitterness toward the "suspicious and strict" inhabitants of Gurna who had refused to cooperate and "were not able to put into words even their material requirements in housing."<sup>19</sup> It is easy to criticize Fathy today, whether for his paternalism toward villagers who stood in the way of his architectural vision, or for the cosmopolitanism that led him to propagate this vision in widely admired books published in English and French but cut him off from those who preferred to read in Arabic.<sup>20</sup> My concern here is not with Hassan Fathy, however, but with those events in the 1940s in Gurna, where the attempt to reappropriate and preserve an Egyptian vernacular was simultaneously born and destroyed. It is this relationship between culture and destruction, between national heritage and its subversion, that I am going to explore. Why did the manufacture of the modern vernacular, the attempt to revive or preserve a peasant culture, as well as the protection of a more ancient, archaeological past, seem to depend upon a relationship of force and a structure of antagonism? Is there something larger one can learn from the fact that the birth of a national heritage movement in New Gurna based upon the building methods of peasant architecture was also the moment of its violent demise?

The history of Hassan Fathy's vernacular model village intersects with a continuing effort to present and preserve a different national heritage,

the monuments of ancient Egypt. Fifty years later, toward the close of the twentieth century, the road past New Gurna was filled with tourist buses, which stopped beyond the village at the Colossi of Memnon before proceeding to the Valley of the Kings and other ancient sites. None of the buses ever stopped at the model village, which was barely visible behind the police inspection points and tourist signs that lined the main road. "The Village," as locals still referred to the place, was a thriving community, but Fathy's houses were by now overlaid with additions and extra floors (to the extent that domed roofs allowed), or in many cases pulled down. Fathy's village school, whose domed roof had collapsed from neglect, was demolished by the Ministry of Education in the late 1980s and replaced with a larger school built according to the ministry's uniform design for all schools, with a reinforced concrete frame and manufactured brick. The handmade mud bricks of the original school were used as rubble to make the new building's driveway.

One thing, however, survived intact after more than fifty years: the unfulfilled desire to evict the inhabitants of the old village of Gurna. After several intervening failures, between 1992 and 1994 new plans were drawn up, as part of a master plan for Luxor funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to depopulate the seven or eight hamlets on the Gurna escarpment, from Sawalim in the north to Gurnat Mar'i in the south, as well as the neighboring hamlet of Medinat Habu (the home of Critchfield's *Shahhat*).<sup>21</sup> Over the following four years new villages again were built, this time located in the desert five to ten kilometers north of old Gurna, and again the households of Gurna largely refused to move and see their village demolished. On January 17, 1998, after several earlier skirmishes, a government bulldozer accompanied by two truckloads of armed police moved into Gurna to carry out demolitions. A group of about three hundred villagers gathered, later swelling to several thousand, and drove the police back with stones, pushing their bulldozer into a canal. The police opened fire on the villagers with automatic rifles, killing four and leaving more than twenty injured.<sup>22</sup> This incident set back the relocation plans, but by the end of the same year the head of Luxor City Council, Major General Selmi Selim, confirmed that the plans to depopulate "nine shanty areas known as Old Gurna" would go ahead, as part of a vision to turn the area into "an open air museum and cultural preserve."<sup>23</sup> As he explained to the press, "You can't afford to have this heritage wasted because of informal houses being built in an uncivilized manner."<sup>24</sup>

The major general's understanding of "heritage" was very different from Hassan Fathy's. Fathy had never succeeded in persuading the Eryp-

tian government that it had anything to learn from the peasant. His conviction that a modern, national style, as well as solutions to the practical problems of modernity, could be found in the ways villagers had traditionally done things had no place in official visions of technical development and a tourist-based heritage industry. Yet for all their differences, the two perhaps had something in common. The major general's use of the term "uncivilized" to justify the evictions echoed the earlier language of Hassan Fathy. Fathy's account of the events of the 1940s tells the history of planning and building New Gurna as a story of the progress of culture and intelligence, impeded by the ignorance and lawlessness of the natives. The families of Gurna lived mostly as tomb robbers, Fathy said (an accusation to which I will come back), and it was to preserve this lawless way of life that they sabotaged his project. (In the plans for the model village there were to be several public buildings, including a theater and an exhibition hall, intended to create the kind of public spirit that Fathy felt was missing in ordinary villages; but there was also to be another kind of building not usually found in villages, a police station.) This violence and lawlessness provided the pretext for building the new village. It was only by addressing the problems of the ignorance of the peasant and the absence of civilization that an architect interested in a program to create a modern, peasant vernacular could find an opportunity to work. There had to be some lack, something missing from the peasant, for even a sympathetic modernizer to transform his house into a national style.

I want to begin my analysis of Fathy's project by recalling what seems a minor episode in his account, an event he refers to as the malaria epidemic of 1947. He notes in passing that the epidemic "killed about a third of Gurna's inhabitants," but concentrates more on the restrictions imposed on travel from Cairo and other delays the epidemic caused to his project.<sup>25</sup> It seems startling today that Fathy would not discuss any larger objections to uprooting a community in the midst of such suffering. But in fact there is more to this oversight. Writing twenty years later, Fathy had collapsed together two epidemics. And these events were not just an obstacle to his plans, but the source of the political circumstances that made them possible.

The 1947 epidemic was actually an outbreak of cholera, not malaria, and affected mostly Lower Egypt, although restrictions were placed on travel to and from the south (Fathy helped the villagers in Gurna to sterilize their wells as a measure against any local outbreak). But a few years earlier, in 1942–45, an epidemic of malaria had occurred in the Luxor region, the

outbreak of gambiae malaria, the disease's most lethal form, that I discussed in chapter 1. Brought from the south by recent irrigation work designed to increase the sugarcane plantations, as I mentioned, and by increased wartime traffic with Sudan, it was this earlier epidemic, along with the famine that resulted from wartime food shortages and men too sick to harvest the wheat crop or earn wages cutting cane, that killed more than a third of the people in the Gurna region.<sup>26</sup> Among the 100,000 to 200,000 people who died in the south, the heaviest casualties were in Gurna and other sugarcane plantations, where perennial irrigation enabled the gambiae mosquito to reproduce. It was the manager of the plantation neighboring the Gurna sugar estate who estimated in May 1944 that 80 to 90 percent of the local population had contracted the disease, and the doctor in the nearest town on the west bank, Armant, who reported 80 to 90 deaths a day.<sup>27</sup> Hassan Fathy arrived in Gurna only a few months after the last gambiae mosquito was killed, before the survivors in the local villages had even gathered another harvest.

The gambiae malaria epidemic, as we saw in chapter 1, provoked a political crisis in Cairo. Opposition politicians blamed the large number of deaths on the poverty of the Luxor region and the rest of the extreme south, where a handful of owners controlled most of the land in sugar plantations of thousands of acres each, and the majority of the population was landless and worked for starvation wages. A deputy in parliament argued that living conditions in the Soviet Union were far better. The ruling Wafd party, which expressed the interests of large landowners, was anxious to defuse this radical threat to the principle of landownership. It argued that the cause of the epidemic was not poverty and inequality but the unsanitary living conditions in the villages. Instead of land reform and the redistribution of wealth, it supported a plan to demolish the country's villages and replace them with well-ventilated, sanitary, and attractive model villages.<sup>28</sup>

The idea of solving the problems of the countryside by replacing village housing with model villages had been promoted by a new generation of sociologists, educators, medical experts, and architects.<sup>29</sup> In 1933 the Royal Agricultural Society built a model *'izba* (housing complex) on its estate at Bahtim, near Cairo, and in 1940 gave Hassan Fathy his first large architectural commission, to build a second *'izba* at the same site.<sup>30</sup> Henry Ayrout, whose father and brothers were architects practicing in Cairo, promoted the rebuilding of the country's villages in his study of the Egyptian peasant, *Moeurs et coutumes des fellahs* (Paris, 1938), which was republished in Cairo in French and Arabic editions in 1942 and English in 1945.<sup>31</sup> In 1941 the Cairo architectural review *al-Imara* launched a campaign for vil-

lage reconstruction and published a plan for a model village.<sup>32</sup> None of these proposals received government funding, until the political crisis of 1944–45, when Hassan Fathy was invited by the Antiquities Department to construct his model village at Gurna.

The government purchased the fifty acres of sugarcane land from Boulos Hanna Pasha, who owned thousands of acres in the Gurna region and was one of the largest landowners in Upper Egypt. The fifty acres were to provide space for the village with its generously proportioned houses and its numerous public buildings, a freshwater pond for swimming (to keep children from the canals, where they contracted schistosomiasis), and a public park for recreation—but not a single acre on which to grow food. Unable to consider the dangerous question of villagers' rights to agricultural land, Fathy helped establish a textile workshop, employing twenty child weavers, to provide some income for the village. A visiting government official noticed that the children in the workshop "looked thin and hungry," and suggested that they be given a bowl of lentil soup every day. "It was a sensible and practical suggestion," Fathy admits. But no money could be found to provide the food.<sup>33</sup> The solutions Fathy pursued were architectural and did not address questions of landownership. This was not seen, however, as a limitation. Fathy saw his village as a pilot project launching a "National Program for Rural Reconstruction" that would lead "to the complete regeneration of the Egyptian countryside through rebuilding its villages."<sup>34</sup>

This approach to social problems was founded on the belief that the recovery of a vernacular national heritage—a heritage that was pure and undebased, and thus clean and sanitary—would provide a means to the recovery of social energy, health, and purpose. Such thinking went beyond the architectural politics of the later nineteenth century, expressed in the rebuilding of Cairo and other large towns and the construction of workers' housing on agricultural estates as rectilinear, visually organized spaces.<sup>35</sup> Planning and rebuilding would now lead to the construction of new peasant selves. At the same time it offered an alternative to impractical and controversial proposals that threatened the social order of landownership. Fathy was a farsighted individual, devoted to the new possibilities of planning and architecture, not just for their end results, but as a process. He insisted on the participation of villagers in the design—a novel idea—and believed the very process of planning would be the means for them to recover their lost individuality (about which Ayrout had written), through developing their power to make decisions. They would develop into subjects of the nation by discovering, in the rebuilding of their heritage, the ability to think for

themselves. "Ideally," Fathy wrote, "if the village were to take three years to build, the designing should go on for two years and eleven months."<sup>36</sup>

This was a radical view of the possibilities for peasant initiative and peasant culture. The limitation we can now see—the inability to consider that villagers might prefer to stay in the houses they had already designed and built themselves—reflected the new hubris of planning. Fathy prided himself on the fact that in New Gurna, a village intended to house seven thousand people, every house was to be individually designed. Yet this desire embodied a contradiction, the oxymoron of planned individuality. What was distinctive in village housing was precisely that villages never planned their houses as finished objects. They built them to grow with the households and activities they housed, expanding and subdividing them, adding and removing extra floors, turning rooms into workshops, stables, or storefronts, over years or generations. The irregular streets and interlocking houses that Fathy designed for New Gurna expressed his attempt to recreate the way the villagers' "customs and taboos, their friendships and their disputes [were] intimately integrated into the topography, into every wall and beam of the village."<sup>37</sup> But to produce this irregularity as something planned in advance, the houses had to be placed tightly together, so that streets could twist and interlocking relationships find expression in the village's topography. As a result, the planning provided no space for the houses to be later expanded or reorganized.

Fathy's attitudes toward problems of peasant initiative also expressed the fact that he himself was from the landowning class (his father was the owner of one or more estates) and indeed was something of a royalist, with admirers and supporters among the Egyptian royal family, including the sisters of King Farouk.<sup>38</sup> His architectural commissions came from the same milieu, for only large institutions or wealthy individuals could afford the luxury of architecture. Before receiving the commission to build the village of New Gurna, he designed the model farm for the Royal Agricultural Society (1941) and a headquarters at the Red Sea port of Safaga for the Anglo-American-controlled Chilean Nitrate Company (1942), two institutions supporting large-scale farming. Most of his other architectural designs in this period were country houses for the proprietors of large agricultural estates.<sup>39</sup>

If Fathy saw the villagers of Gurna as unable "to put into words even their material requirements in housing," when one puts his project into a larger social context it is the architect who is perhaps not able to put into words its material basis. The sugar plantations of the Gurna region had originally been village land. As we saw in chapter 2, from the mid-nineteenth century the

ruling household in Cairo began to take over village land, paying little or no compensation, as new irrigation schemes made it possible to channel the annual Nile flood and plant the sugarcane crop year-round. After the country's Ottoman Turkish ruling household was declared bankrupt by its British and French bankers in 1875 and the British army invaded and occupied Egypt, the foreign bankers managed the estates and then auctioned them off, not returning them to the original village owners but selling them to barons like Boulos Hanna and Ahmad 'Abbud. In 1908, when the bankers auctioned the former viceregal estates near Gurna, local villagers discovered that their land and even their houses were to become the property of the new plantation owners. When the bailiffs later came to evict the villagers, in one reported instance, they met resistance. Fifteen members of the eviction force were injured, and fifty-seven villagers were arrested, one of who died in custody.<sup>40</sup> So when the government neglected to provide New Gurna with land to grow its own food, or even bowls of lentil soup for child workers, this was not an insignificant oversight. It was the continuation of a process of expropriation constructed and reconstructed over the preceding hundred years through the depredations of a ruling elite and their European bankers. And it was to counter the new challenges to this coercive order, following the malaria epidemic of 1942–45, that men were dreaming up plans for model villages and Fathy was proclaiming the architect's unique ability "to revive the peasant's faith in his own culture."<sup>41</sup>

In projects of this sort one sees the difficulties of making the nation. To perform the nation, groups must be included by first declaring them excluded for their lack of civilization, villages destroyed in order to preserve them, pasts declared lost so that they may be recovered. Fathy wanted to "revive" an indigenous culture as a means of developing an Egyptian national heritage. To perform this revival, he needed the people of Gurna. Yet he needed them as a people outside the nation, whose removal would help bring the nation and its past into being. The Gurnawis were to be treated as ignorant, uncivilized, and incapable of preserving their own architectural heritage. Only by seeing them in this way would the architect have an opportunity to intervene, presenting himself as the rediscoverer of a local heritage that the locals themselves no longer recognized or knew how to value. As the spokesman bringing this heritage into national politics, the architect would enable the past to speak and play its role in giving the modern nation its character.

The people of Gurna could enter into national politics only by submitting to an act of violence. To preserve their heritage, the architect first had to destroy it. Old Gurna was to be pulled down and rebuilt—and not just because

it was built over antiquities, for if the project succeeded, Fathy hoped that every other village of Egypt would also be demolished and rebuilt (a proposal later taken up by the United States development program in Egypt).<sup>42</sup> The preservation of the past required its destruction so that the past could be rebuilt. Likewise, the performing of the nation required that every one of its rural inhabitants be declared outside the nation, uncivilized and unhygienic, so that in rendering them civilized and clean, the nation could be made.

When Fathy first visited one of his family's own large farms, near Talkha in the Nile Delta, "it was a terrible experience," he reports. "I had had no idea until then of the horrible squalor and ugliness amid which the peasants on a farm lived. I saw a collection of mud huts, low, dark, and dirty, with no windows, no latrines, no clean water, cattle living practically in the same room with people; there was not the remotest connection with the idyllic countryside of my imagination."<sup>43</sup> Fathy persuaded his parents to rebuild the workers' housing, or *'izba*. As he embarked on this and subsequent projects, however, he discovered two difficulties, one aesthetic and one practical. It was the solution to this dual difficulty that was to define the style of building for which he became famous. The genealogy of the solution is important, because it involves a series of interlocking elements over which Fathy had no control. These illuminate the complexities of turning to the peasant, or to the ideal countryside of the imagination, in the attempt to solve national problems and define a national style.

The aesthetic problem was that Fathy was unable to discover a model for the vernacular form he sought to revive in any of the villages he was rebuilding, or any other village he visited in Egypt. The idyllic countryside of his imagination existed nowhere. The practical difficulty was that Egypt was without forests and had no commercial supplies of lumber, which Fathy needed to build the roofs of his mud-brick structures. In 1941, when building the model farm for the Royal Agricultural Society at Bahtim, the difficulty became acute, because the project included large granaries whose roofs spanned a greater width than those of the ordinary workers' housing. To solve the problem Fathy attempted to build the granary roofs without lumber in the form of vaults and domes, employing the same mud bricks used for the walls. The vaults were intended to support themselves using the principle of the arch, and in turn carry the weight of the domes. This complex method was unsuccessful, however, and the domes collapsed.<sup>44</sup>

Hassan Fathy's brother, 'Ali, who worked as an engineer on the Aswan Dam, helped him overcome the problem. He invited him to come and visit

the village of Gharb Aswan, near the dam, where Fathy finally found houses whose roofs included large mud-brick vaults. Gharb Aswan, he wrote,

was a new world for me, a whole village of spacious, lovely, clean, and harmonious houses each more beautiful than the next. There was nothing else like it in Egypt; a village from some dream country . . . whose architecture had been preserved for centuries uncontaminated by foreign influences. . . . Not a trace of the miserly huddle of the usual Egyptian village, but house after house, tall, easy, roofed cleanly with a brick vault. . . . I realized that I was looking at the living survivor of traditional Egyptian architecture.<sup>45</sup>

Fathy recruited a master mason from the village, 'Alaa al-Din Mustafa, who showed him the method of building vaults and worked with him on New Gurna and several of his subsequent projects. The mud-brick vault and dome henceforth defined Fathy's Egyptian vernacular. At the same time, he believed, by eliminating the use of expensive timber, these methods provided a means of building "an architecture for the poor."

There were problems with Fathy's solutions on both counts, the aesthetic and the practical. On the aesthetic side, Gharb Aswan was a Nubian village, and its houses were built in the distinctive style of the Kanuzi, one of the two main Nubian linguistic and cultural groups. Fathy chose to see this style as the survival of a pure Egyptian architecture, "uncontaminated by foreign influences." The Egyptian government did not recognize the Nubians, whose country spanned the modern border between Egypt and Sudan, as a distinct people or ethnicity, so Fathy's view of Nubian cultures as Egyptian was in accord with official opinion, even if the Kanuzi themselves might not have considered their heritage Egyptian. Still, it was ironic—and instructive—that only among a people whose language, culture, and history were all different from those said to define modern Egypt could Fathy find an Egypt uncontaminated by the foreign.<sup>46</sup> The point is not to discredit Fathy's desire for a vernacular Egyptian architecture, but to acknowledge its complex and heterogeneous origins.

More of an obstacle to the success of this new aesthetic was that in both Egypt and Nubia domes carried a rather different connotation in vernacular architecture than the meaning Fathy wanted to give them. They were traditionally used only for the roofs of mosques, churches, and tombs. While this association may not have been especially resonant for a cosmopolitan Cairo architect trained in the modernist style, in rural Egypt, especially in the south, domes were used everywhere for the small roofs of saints' tombs, and never for the building of houses. Despite what many

agreed was the powerful simplicity and beauty of Fathy's designs, he could never erase the existing significance of domes in the countryside, which transformed his own designs into an inappropriate confusion of sacred and domestic styles.

On the practical side, vaults and domes were a solution to a problem that for most villagers in Egypt did not exist. Fathy found timber expensive—and calculated elaborate mud-brick roofs to be more affordable—because he was obliged to purchase it commercially. For the farm at Bahtim he was building an entire model hamlet, and in particular the large granaries to store the landowner's grain, something ordinary villagers never had the luxury of needing, so he required timber in large amounts. Egypt imported its commercial timber from Romania. The Second World War cut off these supplies and caused the British army to requisition materials already in the country. The resulting timber shortage obliged Fathy to turn to the more complicated alternative of vaults, which required large quantities of mud brick and the labor of skilled masons.

In Gurna and other parts of Upper Egypt there was a local method of vaulting using a technique known as *tuuf*, which was simpler and less expensive than Fathy's method.<sup>47</sup> But this was used only in exceptional circumstances, such as where termites were present, and Fathy seems not to have learned of its existence. In most cases villagers made flat roofs from the trunks of locally grown date palms, overlaid with palm stalks and mud plaster. Unlike Fathy, they had no need to purchase commercial supplies of wood. They built their houses themselves, and when it was time to build or extend a house another palm tree could always be found, usually one of the villager's own. Palms, as it happens, are male or female, and only the latter produce fruit. Just one male tree was needed to fertilize every fifteen or twenty females, so the other males could be cut for timber.<sup>48</sup> Thanks to the reproductive mechanisms of the date palm, for the villager, unlike the architect, there was no timber shortage, and thus no need for the complexities of domes.

For reasons both aesthetic and practical, Fathy's mud-brick domes and vaults never caught on, except among a small group of his students and friends. The use of mud brick for any kind of architecture, moreover, was never supported by Egyptian officialdom or the architectural profession, and large building contractors like Osman Ahmed Osman lobbied successfully against Fathy's ideas. Villagers continued to build their own houses with mud brick walls. But even these gradually gave way to the use of baked red brick and concrete. Curiously, the elements that were bringing

about the demise of this local heritage were the same developments that had enabled Fathy to discover his distinctive style—large-scale agriculture, and the Aswan Dam.

By the end of the 1960s, two decades after the building of New Gurna, the government had taken the place of large landowners in deciding what to grow and had constructed a second dam at Aswan. The High Dam ended the annual flooding of the Nile and enabled the authorities to extend the cultivation of sugarcane, which displaced the growing of wheat. Villagers no longer had the long weeks of the Nile flood, which in the past provided time for the laborious work of brick making and communal house building. Many no longer had their own wheat to provide the straw needed for bricks and plaster. For both these reasons, building with mud brick began to lose its advantages over the faster method of building with reinforced concrete.

Thanks to the dam, moreover, even the mud itself was less and less available. The fields were no longer flooded, there was no longer an annual deposit of Nile silt, and no longer any renewal of the alluvial mud out of which mud-brick houses were built. Before the High Dam, the Nile carried some 124 million tons of sediment to the sea each year, depositing nearly ten million tons on the flood plain. After the dam, 98 percent of that sediment remained behind the dam.<sup>49</sup> By the 1980s the government was forced to ban the use of alluvial mud for brick making, to protect agricultural land. Fathy's celebration of a vernacular based on centuries of accumulation of local mud was launched at precisely the moment when (and for reasons connected with the fact that) the mud for the first time in history was no longer in supply.

If the irrigation works at Aswan caused mud-brick building to gradually disappear, ironically they had also played an unnoticed role in Fathy's production of an Egyptian vernacular. Gharb Aswan, the village in which Fathy discovered an Egyptian architecture "preserved for centuries," was in fact a modern village. It was built at the turn of the century to house people from the Nubian villages to the south, which were submerged by the reservoir created by the first Aswan Dam.<sup>50</sup> The dam had given Fathy the opportunity to build his vernacular village, by creating first the estates and then the epidemics that brought the politics of rural reconstruction into being. These irrigation works had simultaneously destroyed the country of Nubia, whose rebuilt houses were the inspiration for his Egyptian vernacular. The nation, and its heritage, must be made out of the material lives of others. In doing so, however, it incorporates processes and materials whose use and meaning it does not entirely control.

## THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PAST

Fifty years later the government was still trying to evict the population of old Gurna, and still describing them as lawless and unhygienic. To the old arguments about tomb robbing, official statements in the 1990s now added the claim that their "living conditions are poor, unhygienic, and spoil the view," and that the presence of this large population in what was now recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site prevented its archaeological preservation and its development as an "open air museum."<sup>51</sup>

The issues were still those of heritage and civilization. But by the close of the twentieth century, Hassan Fathy's vision of a national culture inspired by the revival of peasant initiative and know-how had disappeared, along with most of the houses of his model village. Instead the government planned an open-air museum, in which the role of the peasant, as we will see, was rather smaller. The development plans of the 1980s and 1990s are discussed more fully in the final section of this book. But the plans for the development of tourism and national heritage in Gurna can provide an introduction to these issues, as well as a contrast with the peasant politics of an earlier period.

In 1982 the World Bank hired the U.S. consulting firm Arthur D. Little to draw up a program for increasing tourism revenue in Luxor (the same firm had been hired to do a similar study in 1953).<sup>52</sup> The consultants revived the proposal for the depopulation of Gurna, along with Hassan Fathy's scheme to set up a cooperative to improve the quality of locally made souvenirs. With the local population removed, the increase in tourism revenue was to come from better "visitor management" and improved infrastructure to enable the development of luxury hotels and Nile cruise ships. Since there was a limit to the number of tourists who could be squeezed each hour in and out of King Tutankhamen's tomb, income growth was to come partly from a shift toward wealthier tourists. The government proceeded to spend \$60 million on these improvements, more than half of it borrowed from the World Bank to pay for foreign consultants and contractors.<sup>53</sup>

These investments made possible a rapid growth in tourism. From 1982 to 1992 the number of visitors to Egypt and their estimated expenditures more than doubled (although attacks by Islamic militants caused numbers to dip again in the 1990s).<sup>54</sup> In Luxor most of the growth, as planned, was in luxury hotels and cruise ships. Across the river in Gurna, those who had established small hotels or other tourist enterprises before the development ban was imposed did well. They typically put their profits into im-

porting small air-conditioned tour buses from Germany and Japan, or buying land and putting up apartment buildings in Luxor. For many villagers, however, there was almost no way of breaking into the tourist business, except for those who found unskilled work on the cruise ships at below-subsistence wages. A few dozen young men did better by finding a foreign tourist to marry—usually a much older woman, who might visit each winter for a few weeks and with luck was wealthy enough to set the husband up in business. One woman, an enterprising California divorcée named Happy, began to build a small hotel on the edge of the desert south of the Theban Necropolis.<sup>55</sup> The building was stopped by the authorities, of course, and after six years and many payments to persuade the officials to allow construction to proceed the hotel was still not quite finished. Most of the husbands settled for something less, such as an imported car to run as a tourist taxi. Cruising past those working in the sugarcane fields in their air-conditioned Peugeots, these young men seemed to underline the separation of the tourist world from the village.

The World Bank's program was designed to increase this separation. Arthur D. Little, Inc., conducted a survey of tourists' experiences in Luxor and reported, as they had in their 1953 study, that the biggest problem concerned the visitors' contact with the local population. Tourists complained of being bothered continually by people trying to take them somewhere or sell them something. The consultants recommended that no further peddlers' licenses be issued.

More significantly, the visitor management scheme they devised was planned to minimize unregulated contact with the tourists and increase their physical separation from the local community. Separate river ferry and bus facilities were developed to isolate the movement of tourists from local traffic. An enclosed visitor center with its own restaurant and shops was to be built to enclose the tourists waiting for transportation. In a village adjacent to Gurna the plans called for an elevated walkway to be erected through the middle of the hamlet, so that tourists could cross from the bus parking lot to the Pharaonic temple without touching the village itself.

Enclave tourism, as this kind of arrangement is called, had become the typical pattern of tourist development in regions outside Europe and North America. It appeared to be required by the increasing disparity between the wealth of the tourists and the poverty of those whose countries they visited. The Egyptian Ministry of Tourism appealed to foreign capitalists considering putting money into hotels or other tourist enterprises in Egypt with the claim that investors were "enjoying outstanding profits in the tourism field," thanks to the easy repatriation of those profits and to

"labor costs that are more than competitive on a world-wide scale."<sup>56</sup> In the late 1980s the ministry calculated that each tourist spent on average \$100 a day in Egypt, which was more than most hotel employees earned in a month. A decade later the disparity was far greater.<sup>57</sup> The difference in wealth was so pronounced that the tourists' enjoyment could only be secured by their physical separation from the host community.

There was a further reason for the creation of enclave tourism. As the industry became concentrated in the hands of luxury hotels under the management of U.S.- or European-based international chains, along with half a dozen large Egyptian entrepreneurs, the hotel managers sought to increase their profits by containing more tourist expenditure within their own establishments.<sup>58</sup> The grand Egyptian hotels that used to provide little more than spacious accommodations and an elegant dining room were replaced by hotel complexes that offered three or four different restaurants and cuisines, several bars, shopping arcades, a swimming pool and fitness club, cruises and excursions, business facilities, and evening lectures and entertainment. The Nile cruise ships and the walled "tourist villages" popular where space was plentiful, such as the Red Sea coast, were even more self-contained.

In chapter 2 we encountered a different kind of walled village, the *'izba* or housing complex built for the workers on large agricultural estates. There is no similarity between the two kinds of enclosures, except this: both represent methods to contain a population, to establish a local zone of sovereignty where external forms of law, exchange, or movement might not apply. In a later chapter we will consider how what is called capitalism or the market adopts many different strategies to build enclosures or enclaves of this sort.

If the *'izba* was built to keep the peasants in, the enclave hotel was built to keep them out. The local population, except for a small elite, was excluded by the prices charged and the guards posted at the gate. To enter particular areas, such as the swimming pool or gambling casino, a foreign passport might be required. The result was a system of almost total segregation. Most Luxor tourists found themselves living, eating, and sleeping in their enclave hotels, traveling in separate air-conditioned taxis and buses, and going to separate entertainments. The few occasions in which organized tourists encountered the local street, whether half an hour set aside for shopping in the Luxor bazaar or a five-minute walk from the cruise ship to an archaeological site through a strip of village, became frenzied scenes in which local peddlers, merchants, and entrepreneurs tried to secure some small share of the tourist business.

The segregation was further encouraged by government and World Bank policy. In the 1980s the World Bank directed Egyptian public funds into building the infrastructure for tourist development. In the 1990s the World Bank pushed for the profits from this public investment to be switched into private Egyptian and foreign hands. Supported by a former IMF employee and banker-turned-minister of tourism, Fu'ad Sultan, in 1992 the World Bank paid the consultants Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte to draw up plans to sell off the country's luxury hotels, which, although managed by international hotel chains, were still owned by the state.<sup>59</sup> The hotels were highly profitable, providing returns of up to 50 percent of revenue or more. As the consultants acknowledged, the investors enjoyed prospects for windfall profits from the future resale of undervalued properties.<sup>60</sup>

Whatever the windfall, the increased control of Luxor tourism by outside capital had two likely consequences. First, it would send not just the profits from tourism abroad, but tourist expenditure in general. Increasing international integration of the tourist industry decreases the proportion of tourist expenditure that remains in the host country or region.<sup>61</sup> The integration of the hotel industry was accompanied in the 1990s by that of the foreign tour operators.<sup>62</sup> Second, as those who purchased these assets increased the pressure on local managers to build their share of a limited market, the process of segregating the tourists within their luxury enclaves would intensify. For the young men of Gurna and neighboring villages seeking employment, both developments were likely to decrease the proportion of tourism income available to the local community.

Yet even as the process of segregation developed, the lives of the local community were increasingly affected by the tourist presence. Because of the kind of industry tourism is, its development involves more than a simple process of segregation. A conventional industry, whether based in manufacturing or agriculture, involves organizing people to produce. Mass production relies upon all the well-known methods of recruiting and disciplining a workforce, organizing their use of time, their movement, and their arrangement in physical space, and developing systems of instruction, supervision, and management. Mass tourism, by contrast, involves organizing people to consume. It relies upon similar methods of managing flows and timetables, arranging physical space, and instructing and supervising, to maximize the process of consumption.

Tourism is an industry of consumption, and the consumption not of individual goods but of a more complex commodity, experiences. No object of modern consumption is ever just a thing. The purchase of food, clothing, or cars is always the purchase of a certain taste, lifestyle, or experience. One

pays not just for the thing but for what it signifies. With tourism, this consumption of what things signify is taken to the extreme. The tourist industry sells not individual objects of signification but entire worlds of experience and meaning.

In Luxor the tourism industry marketed the consumption of ancient Egypt. The experience was created out of the archaeological sites, but also by organizing the contemporary society to appear as a reflection and extension of the past. The 1982 World Bank report on visitor management explained that "the creation of an *overall environment* is needed on the West Bank in order for Luxor to reach its full market potential."<sup>63</sup> This meant turning Gurna into an "open air museum," its population moved out, and its houses destroyed. A few houses were to be left standing as examples of local architecture, and used to house artisans and craftsmen producing tourist artifacts.

The new plans to evict the population of Gurna were formalized in a study carried out between 1992 and 1994. The new relocation site, first identified and surveyed in the 1950s, lay several kilometers to the north. Adopting themes first articulated by Hassan Fathy and subsequently transformed into standard development practice, the Terms of Reference for the relocation study, funded by USAID, emphasized the need for detailed architectural, social, and cultural surveys of the old village and "community participation" in the planning. The former now involved the making of an ethnographic film about the community that was to be removed, while "community participation" was reduced to constructing plywood model houses in three sizes, which villagers could visit to select their house design.<sup>64</sup> Several hundred villagers, in most cases those who were able to exchange one old house for several new ones, agreed to move to the new settlements, leading to extreme overcrowding (since 1978 the government had banned further building in old Gurna). So only a few dozen old houses were available for demolition. When the government tried to force other villagers to move, the result more than once was resistance, culminating in the riot and shootings of January 1998.

The World Bank, USAID, and the Egyptian Government spent tens of millions of dollars during the 1990s alone planning and attempting once again the eviction of the people of Gurna.<sup>65</sup> Despite this large employment of architects, planners, ethnographers, bureaucrats, and bulldozers, there was little investigation of the actual need for the evictions or their possible impact. While there were studies of the aesthetics and culture of old Gurna,

there was to be no investigation of the actual problems these people were said to be creating, which might put in question the need for the evictions and for the employment of so much expertise.

The alleged problems can be briefly examined. First, it was said, the people of Gurna were tomb robbers, an accusation repeated so often that even many critics of the eviction assumed it to be true. The image of tomb robbers was a standard element in national media representations of Gurna, from Shadi 'Abd al-Salam's famous film of 1969, *al-Mumiya* (The Mummy), to a popular television serial aired during the middle of these events in 1996–97, *Hilm al-janubi* (The Southerner's Dream), whose plot turned on the conflict between an evil tomb robber in the Luxor area and an educated hero who sought to defend and rediscover Egypt's heritage.<sup>66</sup> Occasionally the government reinforced these images by staging a raid on a Gurna house. In 1996 Muhammad al-Adhim, sixty-three years old, came home to find that the authorities had discovered a tomb cut into the rock behind the wall of his late great-grandmother's bedroom. The tomb was just an empty tunnel, but this did not stop the authorities from arresting the old man, who worked as an assistant in a local dentist's office, and making a public example of him. "I am completely stunned. I never knew there was a tunnel," he said. "I think the tourist authority just made a balloon to attract foreigners. Tomorrow they will say these slippers I am wearing came from Ramses II." Tomb robbers, he pointed out, were supposed to make lots of money. "But can you tell me where is my Mercedes, where is my six-storey house?"<sup>67</sup>

Over some two hundred years certain households in Gurna formed a small part of the international network that moved the treasures of ancient Egypt to the great museums and private collections of Europe and North America. It is curious that we now look back on the Gurnawis as tomb robbers, but still find it difficult to describe the British Museum in London or the Metropolitan Museum in New York as collections of stolen goods.<sup>68</sup> An illicit trade in Egyptian antiquities still continued, driven by the demand from private collectors in the West. Occasionally these trading rings were broken, however, and news reports showed that the sources of stolen goods were invariably storerooms under the control of the government, dozens of which were dotted around the country, holding as many as a million pieces.<sup>69</sup> These problems might have best been addressed by measures such as better pay and training for local employees of the antiquities authority, more secure storerooms, and a more vigorous international campaign against the American and European dealers. In 1970 UNESCO adopted a convention to prohibit and prevent the international trade in stolen art and antiquities. Thirty years later, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and several other

countries that played an important role in the illegal trade had not ratified the convention.<sup>70</sup> Enforcement was so weak that Interpol estimated that 90 to 95 percent of stolen artifacts were never recovered.<sup>71</sup> Attempts to get the United States and other leading importers of stolen antiquities to pass domestic legislation to prevent the trade were also unsuccessful.<sup>72</sup> It was easier to demand the eviction of villagers from a hillside in southern Egypt than to investigate how the trade in antiquities was actually organized and run and to collaborate on measures against international dealers and buyers. Development agencies, architects, planners, and academics could then repeat without evidence the claim that Gurnawis were tomb robbers.

Second, it was argued, whether or not they were robbing its tombs, the villagers of Gurna were damaging the Theban Necropolis by their very presence. The wastewater from the Gurna houses was damaging the tombs, the authorities claimed, and houses built over tombs “spoiled the view” and prevented the development of tourism.

Again, it is not clear what the evidence was for these claims. The hamlets of Gurna were not allowed to have running water or to dig wells. They had to fetch all the water they needed in wheeled oil drums pulled by donkey. The only running water on the Theban hillside was in the accommodations of the European archaeological missions. Although moisture damage was a serious problem, there was no geological survey of the Gurna site, with its alternating layers of limestone and shale, to assess the impact of habitation (versus, for example, the impact of the general raising of the water table and humidity levels since the building of the Aswan High Dam), or to identify which locations could support human occupation without damage to the tombs.<sup>73</sup> Once again, despite the millions of dollars spent on outside consultants, these basic studies had not been done. Nor was any effort made to consider less disruptive solutions to the problem of wastewater.

Detailed information was available, on the other hand, about the damage that tourists were doing, and especially the damage done by tourists’ wastewater. If a tomb in the Theban Necropolis was occupied by twelve visitors, in one hour their sweat increased the relative humidity by 5 percent. At the peak of the tourist season, up to 4,500 tourists visited the Necropolis every hour. More than one-third of them, between 1,500 and 2,000, visited the three most popular tombs, causing the humidity in them to increase by up to 100 percent, a level at which one-fifth of the wall painting can be lost.<sup>74</sup> Although villagers could be denied running water to reduce the problem of wastewater, there appeared to be no equivalent way to stop tourists from sweating. The master plan for Luxor, of which the depopulation of Gurna was a part, envisioned quadrupling the number of tourists within twenty

years, from one million each year to four million. Every one of those three million extra visitors would want to squeeze themselves, dripping with perspiration, into and out of the tombs of Gurna. Far from eliminating the problem of wastewater, the plans for Gurna were going to add to it significantly.

As for access to the ancient tombs, although a handful of them had houses built over their entrances, there were many hundreds of others that were not concealed by houses yet were not opened up to tourism. Some of these were used by the authorities for other purposes, such as storerooms. The tombs concealed by the houses the authorities wanted to demolish were arguably better off than all the rest. Although tombs of no archaeological significance were often simply cavelike extensions of the house built against them, the few of archaeological merit were closed off from the house itself and controlled by the antiquities department. Moreover, the relationship between household and tomb may represent a more historically interesting aspect of the local heritage than many of the empty tombs cleared out and opened up as tourist sites. Indeed, one or two archaeologists working in the area had started to dig not in uncleared tombs but in the piles of debris cleared out by earlier excavations. Earlier excavators were interested only in Pharaonic treasure, or at most in the art and artifacts of the Pharaonic period. Yet many of the tombs came to serve as human habitations over subsequent centuries, and the debris of earlier excavations contains rich evidence of this long period of Coptic and early Islamic local life. The communities living among the tombs today may date back a mere four or five hundred years. But as van der Spek argues, the relationship they represent between a dead past and a living community is part of the history of the Theban Necropolis.<sup>75</sup>

In 1981 half a million tourists visited Luxor and each stayed for an average of only 2.1 nights. By the 1990s the number of visitors in a good year was more than double that, but the length of stay had declined to an average of less than one night.<sup>76</sup> The local tourist industry had less than twenty-four hours within which to maximize the tourist's consumption. This required a meticulous planning of meals, drinks, sleeping, and entertainment, as well as the requisite trips to Karnak and Luxor temples, the sound and light show, the felucca ride, a visit to the Luxor bazaar, plus trips to King Tutankhamen's tomb and other sundry tombs and temples of the Theban Necropolis across the river.

This mass production of experience produced a curious common interest between tourism's overorganized heritage consumers and some of the

local community. In the 1982 World Bank survey, alongside the complaint about the behavior of peddlers and local merchants, the most frequent tourist request was for more meaningful contact with the local population. Many tourists to Luxor were anxious to escape the routine and meet “real Egyptians.” Many of the local population, interested in diverting tourist expenditure back toward their own needs, were keen to help. Zaynab, for example, had a house directly in front of a parking area for tour buses. Her children would hang around the buses, out of sight of the tour guides, and catch the eye of tourists lagging behind the main group as it headed off toward the temple. They then invited them into the house to watch their mother baking bread at the earthen oven. The children expected a tip of a pound or so, and some of the tourists even offered money to their mother.

The mass consumption of heritage included countless small encounters of this sort, in which the logics of exclusion, impoverishment, and eviction were briefly suspended. Such events operated like a local ecotourism, almost invisible to the large-scale tourist industry, performing, like Zaynab’s children, behind its back, yet for many individual tourists often representing the highlight of their day, far more memorable than all that sweaty Theban heritage. These encounters very occasionally developed into longer exchanges, including the foreign women who as tourists found a part-time husband in the village. None of this was necessarily an ecotourism to celebrate, for it was usually constructed on considerable inequalities and misunderstandings. But it does remind us that the manufacture and consumption of heritage produced encounters beyond the control of heritage managers, where the act of consumption briefly undermined the place of things in the heritage system.

Let me conclude by bringing the question of tourism and the heritage industry back to the issue of producing the nation. In November 1996, the heads of more than seventy Gurna households threatened with eviction and the demolition of their homes signed a petition to the authorities. “We the people of Gurna,” it stated,

. . . have become threatened in our homes, we have become agonized with fear, while our houses are demolished above our heads and we are driven from our homeland. Sirs, you know the feelings suffered by the refugee driven from his home, the exile from his land, the person who becomes a stranger in his own country. We have begun to wonder whether we are Egyptians.

The petition describes the fear and violence of relocation, connecting it to other, more brutal expulsions of a sort that Egyptians in recent history

have not had to face. The villagers then invoke for themselves the idea of the nation, asking the question "whether we are Egyptians." This simple question opens up the contradictions of nation making. Their eviction has been justified as a project of producing the nation. To preserve the heritage of the nation, and to turn those portrayed as lawless and uneducated into honest citizens of the state, they must be expelled from their homes. To produce the nation requires an act of violence, and in revealing this violence its victims bring to light the forces and instabilities that nation making brings into play. The petition continues:

The pretext for all this is that we damage and do harm to tourism and that we threaten the safety of the monuments. We do not understand who has fabricated these rumors. We come from the monuments and by the monuments we exist. Our livelihood is from tourism. We have no source of sustenance beyond God except for our work with tourism. . . . We are married to the tourists.<sup>77</sup>

Against the popular official portrayal of them as backward, unclean, ignorant, and an obstacle to the development of a modern heritage site, they declare "we are married to the tourists." Both a metaphor for their close involvement with the tourist industry, and a reference to the fact that foreign women have in fact married local men, this claim gently but insistently subverts the official rhetoric.

Given that the authorities had been periodically attempting to evict the people of Gurna for more than five decades, and now had on their side all the resources of bulldozers, armed police forces, tourism investors, and U.S. and World Bank consultants, it is important to take seriously the power to subvert the violent plans of the heritage industry. This subversion, I have argued, was not the pure resistance of an indigenous community opposed to the plans of the authorities. It was a subversion that operated within, and opened up to view, the contradictions of the projects of heritage and nation making. The manufacturing of a national heritage attempted to divide the world into consumers of tradition and the dead, depopulated heritage they were to consume. But on numerous levels and in multiple ways, neither the consumers nor those facing eviction agreed to this program. And in their minor acts of disruption, they brought its hidden violence into view.